http://www.thenation.com
by Robert Dreyfuss
Don't expect any miracles after
President Karzai's decision to accept a second round in the much-disputed
Afghan elections. (The latest totals
give Karzai 49.7 percent of the vote from the
August election, just under
the 50 percent needed to avoid a runoff. Earlier, Karzai had claimed
54 percent of the vote.)
First of all, it's unlikely
that a second round of elections will be much fairer, or better run, than
the fraud-marred first round. Turnout,
which was estimated to be about 30 percent
in the August round, may fall further. In Pashtun areas, and in areas where the
Taliban is strong, turnout was often 5 percent -- or less.
Second, the extreme international pressure on Karzai makes him seem
puppet-like, in spite of
his defiance. He was called
or visited by virtually the
entire US government, and
British Prime Minister Brown called Karzai three times
in three days. Senator Kerry, who traveled
to Afghanistan, met repeatedly
with Karzai. In deciding to go along with a second round of elections, perhaps Karzai was acceding to the inevitable. But to many Afghans, his decision will look like what it
is: a humiliating capitulation to US-UK pressure
and intimidation. That can hardly enhance
Karzai's ability to present himself as a credible national leader.
Third, whatever the outcome, the
road ahead is extremely difficult.
Perhaps Karzai will be reelected, the
most likely outcome. Perhaps Karzai and his challenger,
Abdullah Abdullah, will strike
a deal, either after the election -- to form a coalition of sorts -- or before it
happens, thus making a second round unnecessary. But in either case, the
resulting government in
Kabul will still be seen by the armed
opposition, including the Taliban and its allies, and by the majority
of the ethnic Pashtuns as one-sided, representing the interests of the old Northern Alliance, and the ethnic Tajik,
Uzbek and Hazara minorities that dominate it.
The path to a passably stable Afghanistan will require a new Afghan
national compact, one that results in a rebalanced, power-sharing agreement between the ruling powers
in Kabul and the Pashtuns. That, in turn, will mean accommodating the Taliban, or most
of it, and winning the support of the Taliban's backers
in Pakistan.
President Karzai has repeatedly declared his willingess to negotiate a deal with the Taliban
and to convene a tribal council for reconcilation
among Afghanistan's factions. Once the election crisis
is out of the way, it will be critical
for the United States and world powers to support Karzai in that direction -- making it clear, at the
same time, that Karzai may ultimately
have to step aside to make it
work. That's the political solution
to the war, and it will have to be underwritten
by Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, India and Iran, who are all heavily invested in support of Afghanistan's factions. (Iran, for instance, has strongly backed Abdullah.)
Too often, the Obama administration
seems to indicate that they see
the emergence of a new Afghan government
under Karzai as critical to the counterinsurgency (COIN) policy that the generals
are addicted to. But that's a formula
for a Thirty Years' War. A new Afghan government could indeed kick start a solution there, but only if
it's focused on a diplomatic and political settlement, not an escalated war.
